the evolutionary theory of the abstract object - part 5 - rationality

[Wilk]

In this part:
1- I show that rationality is irrational.
2- I communicate what the meaning of human life is.

All rational human actions are motivated by the most animalistic and irrational instincts: rationality is nothing more than a mental instrument - used by an individual - that consists of developing a logic that allows him to think clearly, objectively and free from emotions, so that it helps him to perform actions - counterintuitive depending on the case - that bring him closer to achieving the feat that will benefit him most - in the long term, for example - in the satisfaction of his desires.
In other words, rationality is just an observation instrument that is used by the individual in his animalistic search for pleasure (not necessarily hedonistic) or emotional improvement.
If it does not provide the meaning of life, then the only one that could do so - if possible - would be irrationality. The meaning of life could only be found in irrationality.

Things in themselves – in a private analysis of mysticism and religiosity – do not have objectives because objectives are subjective to a thinking being and the universe is not thinking, it simply exists; therefore, the existence of the universe and any physical phenomenon has no justification: the understanding of their functioning are merely attempts at rational interpretations of the observed phenomena, however, rationality cannot and does not justify the reason behind the existence of the universe itself and of itself.
Rationality also cannot and does not justify (or defend) the reason behind the existence of primitive concepts – that is, the concepts responsible for creating the basis of thought and that theoretically would not need definitions for their affirmation, such as the idea of the geometric point. Once we understand that every primitive concept is the basis of all thought and that its existence is inexplicable and comes from mental processes that date back to our ancestors whose mental function was based on pure instinct - that is, that the primitive concepts that form thought come from the non-rational mental process of these animals - the following question arises: if rationality comes from primitive non-rational concepts - that is, irrational - how could the irrational create the rational?
Answer: irrationality creates rationality in the same way that an infinite mathematical decimal has, within itself, an ordered numerical sequence... Order is found within chaos.
But all order found within chaos is a mere momentary illusion, given that a complete view of the environment would reveal its complete nature, which is chaotic, unpredictable and impossible to be completely understood by reason (its existence is not justifiable).
In the same way, rationality is a mere illusion of momentary order that occurs within the chaotic reality of the mental process. It is no wonder that several logic courses teach that rational argument is the nickname given to the most convincing argument.

As a conclusion:

1 - Firstly, we realize that if rationality exists, it is not enough to understand the chaos of the world;

2 - And, secondly, rationality in practice is not pure, because it is only used by individuals with irrational motivations and its entire basis of ideas was constructed by the irrational, which makes it impossible for any construction or data process not to be subject to being fundamentally irrational.

"Man is an old, blind monkey, who carries a young, crippled monkey that can see. "
There is no reason to live without irrationality and animalistic sentimentality.

Here and now, I propose that life - as a phenomenon - has no purpose because it is not thinking (just like the universe) and, therefore, has no will. However, the living being, unlike the phenomenon of life itself, does have a purpose - given that it is endowed with subjective will. The meaning of human life is centered on the fulfillment of each individual's subjective will, which does not mean that it is necessarily hedonistic, nor objective or clear.
Life, like rationality, does have a reason/function of being (rationality/order) given in an existence without reason to be (irrationality/chaos).
What beautiful poetry. The human irrationality of animalistic sentimentalism is paradoxically what gives meaning to human life, giving it a reason to be.

 

[Wilk]

Analyzing the existing religions/cults, almost all of them have moral codes that seek to determine the rules of fair, correct and ideal social coexistence.

Furthermore, a characteristic of cults is the existence of a leader who represents a divinity or personification of the cult.

Example 1, Christian church:

• Scripture that determines social rules: the Bible;

• Divinity or personification of the group: God or the church.

• Leader who represents the divinity or personification of the group: the pope;

Example 2, the State:

• Scripture that determines social rules: the constitution and other legal works;

• Divinity or personification of the group: the State.

• Leader who represents the divinity or personification of the group: a president.

What would the State be if not a very peculiar religion?

No matter how much it tries to base its rules on philosophical texts by rationalist authors, morality is an indeterminable abstract concept and there is no rational judgment when using indeterminable abstract ideas (Ludwig Wittgenstein); therefore, morality is not rational, but rather irrational and completely subjective, invented and unjustifiable, it is a mere personal choice; there are no rational reasons for the State to defend the selection of a single morality as correct to the detriment of the others (unless it worships a specific thing to be achieved, but that can only be done with a morality). Because they are all equally meaningless to reason.
The seriousness of the legitimacy of the State's morality is as equally functional as the sophistication of the speech of a drunk who communicates in another language and is mute. In other words, I am not diminishing or increasing the degree of legitimacy of the morality imposed by the State: I am denying its existence. The State's scriptures impose a morality that is not legitimate, just like other religions, and indoctrinate people to live according to it without giving them any other option (no child chooses whether to be born inside or outside their State; the simple habit of being born makes them subject to the State's commandments). It is, therefore, an indoctrinating cult. From this point of view, this false rationalism that legitimizes the State removes those questions that challenge the defense of its existence from the minds of its experts.

Its morality, therefore, is based on something other than rationality.

If an individual believes in something irrational, that something is, therefore, religious knowledge.

If the morality defended by the State is irrational, then it is religious knowledge.

Thus, the Democratic State of Law and the others are as secular as the Vatican; their belief system is religious.

Therefore, by presenting religious knowledge present in its scriptures of social order, plus a leader and the figure of the symbol that this represents, the State is constituted as a cult and is, logically, a type of cult. And, unlike the other most famously religious cults, it has been present in almost all Eastern and Western society since its creation (let us remember that there was society before the creation of the State): the State is the largest and most dominant expansionist cult.

 

[Wilk]

Philosophically, we understand that 0.1 is not 1.
0.2 is not 1
0.7 is not 1
0.8 is not 1
0.9 is not 1
0.99 is not 1
0.999999999999 is not 1.
0.999... is not 1 because there is 0.000...1 missing;
These are extremely close numbers; however, no matter how similar they are, they are still different.
Similar is not the same. This is philosophically indisputable.
However, mathematics says:
If: 0.9999... = X
Therefore: 9.999...= 10X

10X - X = 9.999... - 0.999...
9X = 9
X = 9/9 = 1
X = 1 = X = 0.999...
1 = 0.999...

So what? Who is wrong? Mathematics or philosophy? The question is the same, the answers are different and contrary to each other, but equally "rational" and correct.
We must, of course, know that both conceptions are correct within their areas: contradiction and paradox do not mean that there is any error.
Philosophically, the correct answer is the philosophical answer; mathematically, the correct answer is the mathematical answer. In the same way, the issue of ideology and other interpretations that converge with each other - but are equally correct - must be respected and followed within their conceptions. They are not necessarily wrong; the universe can accept different truths within each area. This is the dual nature of abstractions.
The universe continues, at the same time, to consider several opposing points of view, being the same, but not meaning the same. The universe is, for quantum and classical physics, hypocritical.
Divine abstraction is, therefore, possible and contradictory.
And doublethink (George Owell) is justifiable.

 

[Wilk]

There are documents from ancient Greece that use the term madness: for example, we have Plato's book called "Phaedrus", where Socrates establishes the existence of 4 types of madness (in the 13th paragraph of the chapter "Socrates' First Discourse", 1st paragraph of the chapter "In Praise of Love", 9th paragraph of the chapter "The Alternatives of Love"). Despite using the term, Plato never presents a definition of madness.
Furthermore, Descartes, in his book "Meditations on First Philosophy" (in the 4th paragraph), attributes to the madman the lack of judgment, indicating that madness ignores reason; he commits the same act as the ancient Greeks: he discusses madness, attributing classifications or comments to it without presenting a definition.
Throughout history, many have tried to discuss madness, but few have tried to create a universal or exact definition, and these few have failed; but why did they fail? The problem in defining madness lies in the fact that it is an abstract term whose meaning depends on the social context in which it is found (Foucault in “The History of Madness” shows different conceptions of madness in certain historical periods, each with its own definitions). It is because of its social and abstract nature that madness has had its meaning constantly distorted. This is a problem pointed out by Ludwig Wittgenstein: abstract terms are undefined and much of any philosophical discussion that deals with them is nothing more than a game of language. Therefore, the term madness could not be defined, only used by societies while it is vaguely indicated and, consequently, distorted. However, in the absence of a definition, the scientific and professional community of scholars of the human psyche needed to establish a consensus, even if temporary, so that they could standardize their actions in order to get closer to scientific models. Thus, psychiatry became responsible for the act; categorizing, currently through Diagnostic Manuals, certain specific conditions that are configured as types of “madness” - the individual’s maladjustment to the social environment -: this is a way found to be more precise in the dialogue about madness. (DIOGO ALBINO BENOSKI: “CINEMA: REPRESENTATION AND MADNESS”).
This attempt falls into the same error as legal positivism, which is to try to make the interpretation of the law increasingly precise through an inexhaustible production of other texts compiled from interpretations and specifications of the written law. Of course, there will always be the barrier of subjectivity; however, we can also see that the more specified and consolidated the scientific terms are, the less their subjectivity will be. Therefore, the history of the study of the term madness allows us to see (not a solution, but rather a good...) a good treatment of the terms studied, which allows the evolution of the abstract object called "scientific research" to actually occur and, who knows, a future extremely accurate, complex and extensive solution to the problem of subjectivity in communication.
Finally, it is funny to perceive madness as a lack of reason from a phenomenological point of view: madness would be, in this sense, not a quality of the external object, but rather of our interpretation of that object. Thus, madness would always be something projected by the observed onto the madman; in such a way that, for example, a work of art seen by someone who does not like art would be interpreted as meaningless and, therefore, madness... Madness would be a problem of interpretation on the part of the viewer who cannot understand the reasons why the world is the way it is perceived, incapable of understanding the causes of things even at the physical level. Thus, the alienist would always have madness within himself.