Join 65,000+ Looksmaxxing Members!

Register a FREE account today to become a member. Once signed in, you'll be able to participate on this site by adding your own topics and posts, as well as connect with other members through your own private inbox.

  • DISCLAIMER: DO NOT ATTEMPT TREATMENT WITHOUT LICENCED MEDICAL CONSULTATION AND SUPERVISION

    This is a public discussion forum. The owners, staff, and users of this website ARE NOT engaged in rendering professional services to the individual reader. DO NOT use the content of this website as an alternative to personal examination and advice from licenced healthcare providers. DO NOT begin, delay, or discontinue treatments and/or exercises without licenced medical supervision. Learn more

Is Free Will an Illusion?

Pearex

Well-known member
Contributor
Established
Joined
Nov 20, 2025
Messages
847
Solutions
29
Time Online
9d 11h
Reputation
1,908
If all of a person's thoughts, moral judgments, and choices are determined by their genetic makeup, childhood experiences, and the society in which they live, can we truly speak of individual free will? In this case, how fair is it to hold a person morally responsible for their "good" or "bad" actions? If free will is merely an illusion, should legal systems aim to punish or simply to protect society? And if free will does not exist, is a person's effort at self-improvement truly meaningful, or is it merely part of a predetermined process?
 
Register to hide this ad
i thought the same but even though your choices are influenced by these factors at the end of the day it is you who actively uses their brain to pick said choice
You're making a valid point after all, the brain that's active at the moment of decision-making belongs to us. However, the real debate is about how and according to what criteria the brain works. If the brain's decisions aren't entirely independent of previous experiences, biological predispositions, and the conditions it's in, is "active use" a sufficient measure of freedom? A calculator is also active when performing calculations however, it doesn't decide which operation to perform itself. Similarly, does the brain's ability to make decisions mean it's free, or does it merely indicate that it's the final link in a chain of predetermined causes? Therefore, the question shouldn't be "who makes the decision?" but rather how free is the mechanism that makes the decision?
 
You're making a valid point after all, the brain that's active at the moment of decision-making belongs to us. However, the real debate is about how and according to what criteria the brain works. If the brain's decisions aren't entirely independent of previous experiences, biological predispositions, and the conditions it's in, is "active use" a sufficient measure of freedom? A calculator is also active when performing calculations however, it doesn't decide which operation to perform itself. Similarly, does the brain's ability to make decisions mean it's free, or does it merely indicate that it's the final link in a chain of predetermined causes? Therefore, the question shouldn't be "who makes the decision?" but rather "how free is the mechanism that makes the decision?"
a calculator is not conscious enough, i would not compare the brain to it. we have feelings etc and intuition. the question is great, i like it. it depends on how resilient you are. the more resilient you are the more freedom there will be in your choice
 
a calculator is not conscious enough, i would not compare the brain to it. we have feelings etc and intuition. the question is great, i like it. it depends on how resilient you are. the more resilient you are the more freedom there will be in your choice
I agree, equating a human being directly with a simple machine is incomplete consciousness, emotion, and intuition add real depth to decision-making processes. However, the question becomes more complex at this point Are our emotions and intuitions proof of our freedom, or are they more subtle determinants guiding us? The concept of resistance is important but isn't the extent to which a person resists, and the conditions under which they resist, also shaped by past experiences, personality structure, and psychological resilience? If even resistance is a product of certain factors, is freedom something gradual, or are we simply experiencing a less visible form of determinism? Perhaps the issue isn't about being completely free, but about being able to make choices while being aware of how conditioned we are. This awareness, if not freedom itself, is the closest we come to it.
 
Nothing is a man's guilt, but everything is a man's responsibility. That's what I take from reading Robert Sapolsky, Sam Harris and other scientists who speak about free will.
 
Nothing is a man's guilt, but everything is a man's responsibility. That's what I take from reading Robert Sapolsky, Sam Harris and other scientists who speak about free will.
This conclusion is quite consistent and powerful. Making the distinction between "crime" and "responsibility" removes the free will debate from a sterile yes-or-no matter. Humans may not be the absolute agents of their actions however, it is up to them to confront the consequences and transform them. Perhaps free will gains meaning not so much in initiating events, but in how we respond to what happens. This perspective neither contradicts what science says nor reduces humans to completely passive beings.
 
If all of a person's thoughts, moral judgments, and choices are determined by their genetic makeup, childhood experiences, and the society in which they live, can we truly speak of individual free will? In this case, how fair is it to hold a person morally responsible for their "good" or "bad" actions? If free will is merely an illusion, should legal systems aim to punish or simply to protect society? And if free will does not exist, is a person's effort at self-improvement truly meaningful, or is it merely part of a predetermined process?
Just disagreeing for the sake of disagreeing

Free will exists
 
If all of a person's thoughts, moral judgments, and choices are determined by their genetic makeup, childhood experiences, and the society in which they live, can we truly speak of individual free will? In this case, how fair is it to hold a person morally responsible for their "good" or "bad" actions? If free will is merely an illusion, should legal systems aim to punish or simply to protect society? And if free will does not exist, is a person's effort at self-improvement truly meaningful, or is it merely part of a predetermined process?
sir this is .com
 
Just disagreeing for the sake of disagreeing

Free will exists
I understand that sometimes disagreement keeps the thought alive. For me, the issue is less about saying "it exists/it doesn't exist," and more about the extent and limits of free will. That's why discussing the conclusions drawn from different interpretations is more interesting. Still, the act of disagreement keeps the discussion alive, and that's valuable.
 
sir this is .com
You're right, I also saw it not as a "ban," but simply as creating space for reflection. Those who don't want to read it can easily skip it, no problem.
 
If all of a person's thoughts, moral judgments, and choices are determined by their genetic makeup, childhood experiences, and the society in which they live, can we truly speak of individual free will? In this case, how fair is it to hold a person morally responsible for their "good" or "bad" actions? If free will is merely an illusion, should legal systems aim to punish or simply to protect society? And if free will does not exist, is a person's effort at self-improvement truly meaningful, or is it merely part of a predetermined process?
We are literally js controlled by hormones and society
 
If all of a person's thoughts, moral judgments, and choices are determined by their genetic makeup, childhood experiences, and the society in which they live, can we truly speak of individual free will? In this case, how fair is it to hold a person morally responsible for their "good" or "bad" actions? If free will is merely an illusion, should legal systems aim to punish or simply to protect society? And if free will does not exist, is a person's effort at self-improvement truly meaningful, or is it merely part of a predetermined process?
even if something is determined by genetics or environment, it doesn't mean that there's no free will at all
 
even if something is determined by genetics or environment, it doesn't mean that there's no free will at all
Something doesn't need to disappear completely to lose its meaning sometimes, being predetermined already weakens the claim to freedom. If the content, direction, and limits of a decision are pre-shaped by genetic predispositions and environmental conditions, what remains is merely the feeling of acting within that framework. We don't need to wait for the criterion of "complete determinism" to save free will the question is whether we have a say in the reasons for the decision. If we don't choose these reasons, how meaningful is it to call the resulting choice "free"? Therefore, even if determinism doesn't logically destroy free will, it reduces it from a powerful concept to a more subjective experience.
 
We are literally js controlled by hormones and society
It's largely true hormones and society have a significant influence on our behavior. However, saying "we are controlled" assumes this influence is absolute and one-sided. Yet, humans are beings capable of recognizing these influences and sometimes taking a stand against them. This awareness doesn't guarantee complete freedom, but it doesn't make us entirely passive either. Perhaps humans are not beings ruled by hormones and society, but rather beings trying to find their way under their influence.
 
Something doesn't need to disappear completely to lose its meaning sometimes, being predetermined already weakens the claim to freedom. If the content, direction, and limits of a decision are pre-shaped by genetic predispositions and environmental conditions, what remains is merely the feeling of acting within that framework. We don't need to wait for the criterion of "complete determinism" to save free will the question is whether we have a say in the reasons for the decision. If we don't choose these reasons, how meaningful is it to call the resulting choice "free"? Therefore, even if determinism doesn't logically destroy free will, it reduces it from a powerful concept to a more subjective experience.
determinism and free will are compatible cuz they are different categories
look
determinism means something is determined, and free will means you are not limited to do something
so even if everything is determined, it doesn't deny free will cuz free will is about different thing
 
It's largely true hormones and society have a significant influence on our behavior. However, saying "we are controlled" assumes this influence is absolute and one-sided. Yet, humans are beings capable of recognizing these influences and sometimes taking a stand against them. This awareness doesn't guarantee complete freedom, but it doesn't make us entirely passive either. Perhaps humans are not beings ruled by hormones and society, but rather beings trying to find their way under their influence.
if hard determinism is truth, then what determined determinism? there's not a single determinist who can answer to this.
soft determinism is ok tho, i'm a soft determinist. this is compatibilism
 
determinism and free will are compatible cuz they are different categories
look
determinism means something is determined, and free will means you are not limited to do something
so even if everything is determined, it doesn't deny free will cuz free will is about different thing
The problem here is that you're subtly weakening the definition of free will. "Not being limited to doing something" is presented as a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for free will. The real issue is whether we can determine what we want and why we want it. If determinism is true, the fact that we feel "as if there were no obstacles" between options doesn't mean that our reasons for choosing those options are our own. The absence of a physical obstacle doesn't mean the will is free because the content of the will is still the result of predetermined causes. Therefore, declaring determinism and free will compatible by calling them "different categories" strips free will of its causal power, reducing it to a purely subjective experience. This is less about saving free will and more about silently altering its definition.
 
if hard determinism is truth, then what determined determinism? there's not a single determinist who can answer to this.
soft determinism is ok tho, i'm a soft determinist. this is compatibilism
This objection to strict determinism doesn't actually refute determinism because determinism isn't a subject that needs to explain "what determines it." It's a thesis that events in the universe occur within a causal chain. The question, "What determined determinism?" wrongly subjects the theory. As for soft determinism Yes, the claim of compatibility may be theoretically consistent. But the price is abandoning the traditional meaning of free will. Soft determinism redefines free will not as the source of causes, but as acting in accordance with causes. This, rather than saving free will, weakens it. Therefore, the question isn't whether compatibility is possible, but how well it aligns with the word "freedom".
 
The problem here is that you're subtly weakening the definition of free will. "Not being limited to doing something" is presented as a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for free will. The real issue is whether we can determine what we want and why we want it. If determinism is true, the fact that we feel "as if there were no obstacles" between options doesn't mean that our reasons for choosing those options are our own. The absence of a physical obstacle doesn't mean the will is free because the content of the will is still the result of predetermined causes. Therefore, declaring determinism and free will compatible by calling them "different categories" strips free will of its causal power, reducing it to a purely subjective experience. This is less about saving free will and more about silently altering its definition.
the will is not about what we want tho, your desires can be determined (and some desires are determined, by biology) but the will is just your ability to make a decision, so as i said, determinism vs free will debate makes no sense cuz they are compatible
 
This objection to strict determinism doesn't actually refute determinism because determinism isn't a subject that needs to explain "what determines it." It's a thesis that events in the universe occur within a causal chain. The question, "What determined determinism?" wrongly subjects the theory. As for soft determinism Yes, the claim of compatibility may be theoretically consistent. But the price is abandoning the traditional meaning of free will. Soft determinism redefines free will not as the source of causes, but as acting in accordance with causes. This, rather than saving free will, weakens it. Therefore, the question isn't whether compatibility is possible, but how well it aligns with the word "freedom".
i can say that "chain of causes" related to me is ME rather than something external that rules me so hard determinism is wrong
 
the will is not about what we want tho, your desires can be determined (and some desires are determined, by biology) but the will is just your ability to make a decision, so as i said, determinism vs free will debate makes no sense cuz they are compatible
The essence of our disagreement here lies in how willing we are to define free will as "empty." If free will is merely a decision-making mechanism among already determined desires, then yes, it becomes compatible with determinism. But in this case, free will ceases to be the causal source of decisions and is reduced to a mere functional definition. The existence of the capacity to make a decision does not mean that the decision is free because if the process that determines which option appears "reasonable," "attractive," or "inevitable" still operates outside our control, then free will only produces the result, not the direction. Therefore, the determinism-free will debate is not meaningless on the contrary, it reveals in what sense we take free will seriously. Compliance is possible, but the price is abandoning the powerful claim of free will.
 
i can say that "chain of causes" related to me is ME rather than something external that rules me so hard determinism is wrong
Saying "the causal chain is me" sounds intuitively powerful, but it shifts the focus instead of solving the problem. Because the question is already what is this "I" a product of? If this "I" is composed of genetic makeup, neurobiological processes, past experiences, and environmental influences, then calling the last link in the chain "I" doesn't break the chain, it only labels it. Causality doesn't have to be an external force its internal nature doesn't absolve it of being determined. Therefore, strict determinism isn't an assertion that "something from the outside governs us" it's an assertion that "what we call 'we' is itself a causal process." The point of contention here is whether this is acceptable, not whether it's logically wrong.
 
The essence of our disagreement here lies in how willing we are to define free will as "empty." If free will is merely a decision-making mechanism among already determined desires, then yes, it becomes compatible with determinism. But in this case, free will ceases to be the causal source of decisions and is reduced to a mere functional definition. The existence of the capacity to make a decision does not mean that the decision is free because if the process that determines which option appears "reasonable," "attractive," or "inevitable" still operates outside our control, then free will only produces the result, not the direction. Therefore, the determinism-free will debate is not meaningless on the contrary, it reveals in what sense we take free will seriously. Compliance is possible, but the price is abandoning the powerful claim of free will.
ofc you have less control on external things but it doesn't deny that internally you can be free anyway
Saying "the causal chain is me" sounds intuitively powerful, but it shifts the focus instead of solving the problem. Because the question is already what is this "I" a product of? If this "I" is composed of genetic makeup, neurobiological processes, past experiences, and environmental influences, then calling the last link in the chain "I" doesn't break the chain, it only labels it. Causality doesn't have to be an external force its internal nature doesn't absolve it of being determined. Therefore, strict determinism isn't an assertion that "something from the outside governs us" it's an assertion that "what we call 'we' is itself a causal process." The point of contention here is whether this is acceptable, not whether it's logically wrong.
how do you type so fast
this "I" is just soul, what makes you what you are, genetics and experiences are just part of it. it doesn't label the determinism tho because as i said free will and determinism are different categories
 
ofc you have less control on external things but it doesn't deny that internally you can be free anyway

how do you type so fast
this "I" is just soul, what makes you what you are, genetics and experiences are just part of it
The femboy is cooking rn
 
ofc you have less control on external things but it doesn't deny that internally you can be free anyway
The fact that internal processes are “ours” does not mean they are free. If these internal processes are also shaped by our character, biology, and past, then internal rather than external control does not solve the problem of freedom it only shifts its location. Freedom is less about where the process takes place and more about whether we have a say in its causes.
how do you type so fast
this "I" is just soul, what makes you what you are, genetics and experiences are just part of
I'm writing quickly because I've thought about this topic a lot before when we reduce the "self" to the soul, the discussion is no longer based on determinism but on a metaphysical assumption. If the soul is outside and independent of the causal chain, this becomes an accepted freedom from the outset but unless we explain how it influences or connects with decisions, it remains at the level of belief rather than a philosophical argument. At that point, I think we're no longer discussing the same question, but different frameworks.
 
The fact that internal processes are “ours” does not mean they are free. If these internal processes are also shaped by our character, biology, and past, then internal rather than external control does not solve the problem of freedom it only shifts its location. Freedom is less about where the process takes place and more about whether we have a say in its causes.
then it just depends on how you define free will
i gave the definition to it before in this debate but if you define it in a different way, then ok. just say how do you define it
I'm writing quickly because I've thought about this topic a lot before when we reduce the "self" to the soul, the discussion is no longer based on determinism but on a metaphysical assumption. If the soul is outside and independent of the causal chain, this becomes an accepted freedom from the outset but unless we explain how it influences or connects with decisions, it remains at the level of belief rather than a philosophical argument. At that point, I think we're no longer discussing the same question, but different frameworks.
determinism is already a metaphysical assumption lol
the soul is related and not independent of the causality, it is just inner causality but as i said, it doesn't debunk that free will does exist cuz it's a different thing, even if related to causality, it still does exist cuz it's a different category
 
also even if you need to be the first cause to be free, then free will does exist because the god is the first cause. it exists but only in one particular entity. i don't agree with this definition of free will tho
 
The more smart these users want to be the more retarded they seem tbh
 
then it just depends on how you define free will
i gave the definition to it before in this debate but if you define it in a different way, then ok. just say how do you define it
Yes, it's largely a matter of definition. My objection is that the definition is too narrowed to make free will compatible with determinism. By free will, I understand not only the function of making decisions, but also having a meaningful subjective share in the reasons for those decisions. Looking at it with this definition, tension with determinism is inevitable. A different definition might provide compatibility, but then we're not discussing the same thing.
determinism is already a metaphysical assumption lol
the soul is related and not independent of the causality, it is just inner causality but as i said, it doesn't debunk that free will does exist cuz it's a different thing, even if related to causality, it still does exist cuz it's a different category
Yes, determinism is a metaphysical assumption but so is free will. The problem is that simply saying "different category" doesn't solve anything. If will is related to a causal process—whether external or internal—then the scope of freedom is limited by that causality. Separating the category doesn't eliminate the tension it only grants free will a space exempt from causal explanation. This means protecting it definitionally rather than defending it.
 
also even if you need to be the first cause to be free, then free will does exist because the god is the first cause. it exists but only in one particular entity. i don't agree with this definition of free will tho
I understand that this definition attributes free will solely to a metaphysical entity, thus making it inapplicable to humans. I disagree in my view, free will is about humans bearing responsibility and influence in their own decision making processes. The definition may differ, but our disagreement here stems directly from the definition itself, and it seems logical to end the discussion here.
 
Yes, it's largely a matter of definition. My objection is that the definition is too narrowed to make free will compatible with determinism. By free will, I understand not only the function of making decisions, but also having a meaningful subjective share in the reasons for those decisions. Looking at it with this definition, tension with determinism is inevitable. A different definition might provide compatibility, but then we're not discussing the same thing.
but you have subjectiveness in the reasons tho, but only when your will EXISTS, so pretty obvious that you don't have free will on your genetics before when it was decided your will did not exist. if you defined free will as being an completely independent being then yeah this wont be compatible with the deteminism yeah
Yes, determinism is a metaphysical assumption but so is free will. The problem is that simply saying "different category" doesn't solve anything. If will is related to a causal process—whether external or internal—then the scope of freedom is limited by that causality. Separating the category doesn't eliminate the tension it only grants free will a space exempt from causal explanation. This means protecting it definitionally rather than defending it.
scope of freedom is limited but it does exist, even if it is narrow (although i don't think it's narrow but i can take this premise cuz it doesn't change a lot)
 
I understand that this definition attributes free will solely to a metaphysical entity, thus making it inapplicable to humans. I disagree in my view, free will is about humans bearing responsibility and influence in their own decision making processes. The definition may differ, but our disagreement here stems directly from the definition itself, and it seems logical to end the discussion here.
you gave the definition and even according to that i think it still does exist although i don't deny that chain of causes is real unlike kantianists and humeans lol
 
but you have subjectiveness in the reasons tho, but only when your will EXISTS, so pretty obvious that you don't have free will on your genetics before when it was decided your will did not exist. if you defined free will as being an completely independent being then yeah this wont be compatible with the deteminism yeah
You're right, subjective reasons are only meaningful if there is free will if free will is predetermined, the claim of freedom weakens. Our disagreement stems from a difference in definition, and I think we can close the discussion at this point.
scope of freedom is limited but it does exist, even if it is narrow (although i don't think it's narrow but i can take this premise cuz it doesn't change a lot)
I agree, the scope of freedom may be limited even if I accept the narrow framework you're assuming, it doesn't change the fundamental argument. What matters is the existence of this space and our awareness of it.

you gave the definition and even according to that i think it still does exist although i don't deny that chain of causes is real unlike kantianists and humeans lol
I understand, so even though our definitions may differ, ultimately you can still believe in the realm of freedom even while accepting the chain of causality that's a reasonable perspective. It was nice talking to you.
 
It's largely true hormones and society have a significant influence on our behavior. However, saying "we are controlled" assumes this influence is absolute and one-sided. Yet, humans are beings capable of recognizing these influences and sometimes taking a stand against them. This awareness doesn't guarantee complete freedom, but it doesn't make us entirely passive either. Perhaps humans are not beings ruled by hormones and society, but rather beings trying to find their way under their influence.
But our society is also making us, u might grew up with strict parents and neither become a good or rebel child it’s still often based on hormones
 
But our society is also making us, u might grew up with strict parents and neither become a good or rebel child it’s still often based on hormones
Yes, genetic and environmental influences play a big role but that doesn't mean our capacity to observe and direct our own responses disappears entirely. Freedom isn't about being unaffected, but about how we cope with those influences.
 
Yes, genetic and environmental influences play a big role but that doesn't mean our capacity to observe and direct our own responses disappears entirely. Freedom isn't about being unaffected, but about how we cope with those influences.
I mean ur hormones control on how ur brain functions so idk
 
I mean ur hormones control on how ur brain functions so idk
Yes, hormones affect how our brains function but that doesn't mean we're completely passive. Awareness and consciousness still play a role in determining how we cope with these effects. Your opinions are very valuable to me our discussions give me different perspectives and make me think.
 
If all of a person's thoughts, moral judgments, and choices are determined by their genetic makeup, childhood experiences, and the society in which they live, can we truly speak of individual free will? In this case, how fair is it to hold a person morally responsible for their "good" or "bad" actions? If free will is merely an illusion, should legal systems aim to punish or simply to protect society? And if free will does not exist, is a person's effort at self-improvement truly meaningful, or is it merely part of a predetermined process?
-
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back
Top