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I concluded that the “eternal forms” (in the Platonic sense) of social institutions follow rules of proportions similar to those of eternal geometric forms, partly constrained by human nature. Among these limitations, I identified:
Marx argued that economic science is inherently flawed, but he did so by using examples drawn from capitalism. This approach made it seem as though Capital was primarily a critique of capitalism when, despite critiquing it, the central focus of the work was a critique of economic science itself.
From this perspective, socialism—being a system designed using the principles of political economy to achieve a state of communism—would also be inherently flawed, as it relies on economic science that Marx deemed incapable.
Similarly, the goals outlined in the Constitution (and other laws with utopian objectives) for achieving the social state it envisions rely on the implementation of a series of laws without any rational scientific body to develop or plan them. Instead, they emerge as a patchwork of contributions from scattered political agents across the nation (and international treaties), which are expected—almost as if by fate—to transform these legal writings into reality at some point.
The vast gap between the objectives, the theoretical planning required to achieve them, and the external world with its distinct functioning renders these legal proposals entirely fanciful. While it is certainly better to have such objectives than to lack them, the point here is that the structure of the legal system—both within and outside the texts—is configured in a way that makes their realization impossible.
Starting from the premise that the various experiments and historical attempts to defy the postulate of political inequality inherent in the "eternal forms"—and their predictable failures—indicate that human nature compels these movements (both attempts and failures) to occur, I conclude that if there is a solution to implement a different eternal form where the objectives of laws and idealistic political movements succeed, it must involve transcending human nature.
If the attempt to achieve these objectives emerges cyclically throughout human history, it is therefore foreseeable that, once this necessity to transcend human nature is understood, historical movements will arise—partially supported by human rights or idealistic movements (even though human rights can be internally contradictory)—that may genuinely apply to overcome human nature, such as through artificial intelligence or biological alterations.
However, in doing so, the possibility arises of surpassing even the human motivations for social improvement: thus creating beings that simply do not care about these apparent social problems, or even merely increasing the variety of beings with diverse natures, thereby failing to "purify" all humanity in its future forms.
From this, we conclude that the idealism of both economics and law is, unfortunately, impractical. This does not mean, however, that circumstantial improvements are impossible. If the structure of social organization follows the rules of "eternal forms", it might be feasible to alter specific proportions of these forms, much like modifying the length and angles of a triangle. Yet caution is advised, as such attempts could also produce aggravating effects as we saw multiple times in history. Indeed, the constant existence of social suffering apear to be plausible.
- The mandatory structure discovered in the shape of a spider web, where subjects are positioned at the edges and leaders at the center.
- There is variation in the nature of each social individual, but the majority are similar and possess, within themselves, the animalistic impulses to fulfill the dynamics described in the previous point, with the remainder logically being minorities.
- From this, several truths arise, including that there will always be some elite in command, and there will always be some servant to obey (even due to the existence of masochists).
Marx argued that economic science is inherently flawed, but he did so by using examples drawn from capitalism. This approach made it seem as though Capital was primarily a critique of capitalism when, despite critiquing it, the central focus of the work was a critique of economic science itself.
From this perspective, socialism—being a system designed using the principles of political economy to achieve a state of communism—would also be inherently flawed, as it relies on economic science that Marx deemed incapable.
Similarly, the goals outlined in the Constitution (and other laws with utopian objectives) for achieving the social state it envisions rely on the implementation of a series of laws without any rational scientific body to develop or plan them. Instead, they emerge as a patchwork of contributions from scattered political agents across the nation (and international treaties), which are expected—almost as if by fate—to transform these legal writings into reality at some point.
The vast gap between the objectives, the theoretical planning required to achieve them, and the external world with its distinct functioning renders these legal proposals entirely fanciful. While it is certainly better to have such objectives than to lack them, the point here is that the structure of the legal system—both within and outside the texts—is configured in a way that makes their realization impossible.
Starting from the premise that the various experiments and historical attempts to defy the postulate of political inequality inherent in the "eternal forms"—and their predictable failures—indicate that human nature compels these movements (both attempts and failures) to occur, I conclude that if there is a solution to implement a different eternal form where the objectives of laws and idealistic political movements succeed, it must involve transcending human nature.
If the attempt to achieve these objectives emerges cyclically throughout human history, it is therefore foreseeable that, once this necessity to transcend human nature is understood, historical movements will arise—partially supported by human rights or idealistic movements (even though human rights can be internally contradictory)—that may genuinely apply to overcome human nature, such as through artificial intelligence or biological alterations.
However, in doing so, the possibility arises of surpassing even the human motivations for social improvement: thus creating beings that simply do not care about these apparent social problems, or even merely increasing the variety of beings with diverse natures, thereby failing to "purify" all humanity in its future forms.
From this, we conclude that the idealism of both economics and law is, unfortunately, impractical. This does not mean, however, that circumstantial improvements are impossible. If the structure of social organization follows the rules of "eternal forms", it might be feasible to alter specific proportions of these forms, much like modifying the length and angles of a triangle. Yet caution is advised, as such attempts could also produce aggravating effects as we saw multiple times in history. Indeed, the constant existence of social suffering apear to be plausible.
